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The Committee on the Status of Women continues our involvement in the various projects detailed in my previous report. We have been very successful in keeping strong links to the other Diversity Committees and have a number of collaborative projects in the works.
I would like to thank Richard Bett, Interim Executive Director and Jerry Schneewind, Chair of the Board of Officers, for their ongoing efforts to support dialogue between the Diversity Committee Chairs and the National Office. Richard and Jerry hosted meetings for all Diversity Committee Chairs at the divisional meetings of the APA. These meetings enable the Chairs to discuss any questions or concerns with the APA Board Chair and the Executive Director, and provide a forum for communication among the Diversity Committees. I would also like to welcome Elizabeth Radcliffe, incoming Executive Director of the APA, who also participated in the meetings with Diversity Committee Chairs. We look forward to working with Elizabeth and congratulate her on her new position.
As this report goes to press, we are fortunate to be welcoming two new members to the Committee on the Status of Women: Jane Kneller and Georgia Warnke .
NEWS New APA Committee on Inclusiveness
Last year, the Diversity Committee Chairs forwarded a motion to the Board of Officers urging the creation of a standing committee charged with increasing the diversity of the profession. In response to our request, the Board voted unanimously to establish a new Committee on Inclusiveness in the Profession, and voted, again unanimously, to recommend that it become a Standing Committee, and to put this proposal to a vote of the divisions. Although the final vote is not complete as this issue of the Newsletter goes to press, I am pleased to report that the Eastern Division has supported this proposal by a margin of almost two to one (534 in favor, 234 opposed, 16 abstentions). Tallies from other divisions were not yet available.
The Diversity Committee Chairs argued for the importance of such a Standing Committee on the ground that it would make the diversity of the profession a charge of the APA. It is our belief that addressing the problems of underrepresentation in the profession should be a responsibility of the APA as a whole and requires the insights of a Committee who can study the complexities of diversification across the various groups currently represented by the Diversity Committees. This would enable the Diversity
INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE REPORT
Women and the US Constitution: History, Interpretation, and Practice
Baruch College/CUNY, February 8-10, 2001
Lucinda Joy Peach
American University
What is women's relationship to the US Constitution? Are there enduring consequences of women's exclusion from the drafting and ratification of the foundational charter of the US government? Has the Constitution served to promote or disadvantage women's rights over the centuries, and, more significantly, in the United States today? A conference organized by Sibyl Schwarzenbach and Patricia Smith, both of the Department of Philosophy at Baruch College, City University of New York, brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines-law, philosophy, sociology, history, and political science-to explore these and other questions.
The seven conference sessions held over the weekend ranged across topics of historical interpretation, sex discrimination and sexual orientation, labor and economic issues, family law and privacy, domestic violence, race, class, and citizenship. Among the variety of presentations, certain themes emerged again and again-women's exclusion from the founding of the Constitution, their lack of full representation in and by government throughout most of US history, the disadvantages that have resulted from identifying women with the family and "private" sphere of domesticity as opposed to the "public" spheres of employment and politics, the limitations of the Constitution's emphasis on structural rather than substantive fairness, and the failure of the Supreme Court to grant strict scrutiny to gender-based classifications in government regulations which disadvantage women-indicating that these are key issues to understanding both the promise and limitations of the Constitution for benefiting women.
Sibyl Schwarzenbach's opening talk set the framework for the following sessions by describing how, until recently, feminists have approached the Constitution in a piecemeal fashion, dealing only with specific issues such as abortion and pornography, and thus, failing to develop a theory of the Constitution as a whole. Given the exclusion of women's participation and interests from the drafting of the document, Schwarzenbach suggested, it was important to consider how women's allegiance to the Constitution and its history could be maintained.
Of the four main approaches that have been used to analyze the Constitution, which I will abbreviate here for purposes of economy as "originalism," "conventionalism," "naturalism," and "constructivism," Schwarzenbach proposed that the first two are least useful for feminists. 1 The third, while seemingly useful because it appeals to those who have been excluded from the Constitution, suffers from two main problems: first, that women have no unified view of a feminist moral and political theory that could be used to ground this independent ("natural") morality, and second, that such an appeal to an independent moral theory ignores the lessons of history.
This leaves feminists, according to Schwarzenbach, with the fourth approach, which has typically been based on some version of Rawls's principle of "reflective equilibrium." This approach allows for the possibility of a society-wide moralpractical consensus or agreement about the fundamental moral principles to resolve disputes. Yet even this fourth approach is problematic in addressing the "lacuna of women's representation" in the Constitution, Schwarzenbach claimed, since the "basic intuitive ideas" embedded in our public culture have been composed almost entirely by males, and have not included the different forms of "ethical and social reproductive labor "-that is, "the conscious reproduction of human relationships"-especially that performed by women.
To compensate for this exclusion, Schwarzenbach suggested that the "vast repertoire of shared, particular moral convictions" that traditionally have been relegated to the private, domestic sphere must also be included in the "datapool" from which society-wide reflective equilibrium begins. Even with this corrective measure, however, there are still the "cold hard facts" of the Constitution to contend with, including its emphasis on individual and states rights rather than community and collective rights, and on structural issues like the separation of powers and checks and balances rather than reproductive social problems of poverty, basic and universal health care, education, racism, and other social problems.
The papers presented throughout the conference weekend shed light on many of these problems, and the limitations of the Constitution for resolving them. Regarding the structural limitations of the Constitution, Judith Resnick's paper, "Federalism, Federalization, and Globalization," in the session on "International Perspectives," analyzed how the Court's doctrine of "categorical federalism" (which the Court uses to rigidly determine whether a particular challenged activity lies within the province of state or federal regulation), has disadvantaged women, especially in insulating state regulation from the global sphere. The Court's decision in United States v. Morrison (2000) is illustrative. The Court ruled that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the civil rights provisions in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which enabled victims to sue in federal court for violation of their civil rights this civil rights provision. Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale was that the Constitution requires a distinction between what is "truly national and truly local" -thereby designating violence against women as "truly local" and thus insulated from international human rights laws. Contrary to the Court's ruling in Morrison, Resnick emphasized that neither the "local" nor the "national" are natural entities, but, rather, the products of human agency and choice.
The session on "The Founding Period" debated the issue of whether women were in fact "represented in" the Constitution. Jan Lewis argued that they were, since the Federal Convention had accepted James Wilson's suggestion (recorded in the Records of the Federal Convention) that representation in the House of Representatives should be based upon the number of persons "of every age sex and condition," even though Wilson's specific terminology was later amended and appeared in the text of the Constitution as "free persons." Although Lewis concluded that the Constitution in fact represented women, she conceded that it did not permit them to represent themselves, but instead continued the custom of assuming that women would be corrupted by direct representation in affairs of government. Norma Basch's paper on early developments in divorce law in the United States agreed with Lewis that the Founders regarded women as citizens entitled to be represented in government, and as an important part of civil society. She observed that the Constitution did not permit women to be or choose representatives because of their relationship to their husbands under coverture laws (which regarded wives as "one" with their husbands for purposes of law). In opposition to Carole Pateman's theory of a "sexual contract" underlying the social contract, Basch suggested that the development of divorce law to ameliorate the status of women demonstrates a more favorable story about the Founders' views of women. Basch supported her view by describing how divorce reforms favorable to women followed swiftly after establishment of the new republic, paralleling America's "divorce" from England in the Revolution. Such liberal concepts, Basch contended, made the subjection of women more problematic, as Elizabeth Cady Stanton's celebration of divorce as liberating women from slavery suggested.
In her commentary, Carol Berkin disputed both Lewis's and Basch's positive appraisals for women of the Founding period. Critiquing Basch's thesis linking divorce reform to the Revolution, Berkin noted that colonial laws reforming divorce occurred before the Revolution as well, but had been disallowed by the British colonial authorities. Why had absolute divorce not been considered earlier? Who stood to gain the most from the liberalization of divorce law? In contrast to Basch's thesis, Berkin suggested that the sanctity of the marriage contract may have been weakened more by creditors who wanted to insure that they could recover their loans (to which both dower and self-divorce presented obstacles) than by Revolutionary ideals.
Berkin also questioned Lewis's positive interpretation of the Founders' intentions with respect to the representation of women. She suggested that "representation" is an ambiguous term, and likely was intended by Wilson to refer only to how many representatives states would have in the federal government, not to insuring the inclusion of women. Contrary to both panelists' view that liberalism has been a positive political development for women, Berkin pointed to Lynn Hunt's The Family Romance in the French Revolution to suggest that liberalism actually was harmful for women, since it excluded them from public life via custom, the distinction between public and private spheres, and so on.
Women's relationship to citizenship emerged again in the final session, on "Women, Citizenship, and the ERA." Interestingly, all of the papers in this session converged on the conclusion that the ERA was largely unnecessary, given the limits of formal equality under the Constitution, and the Court's recent jurisprudence under the Equal Protection clause. In "Women and Citizenship: the VMI Case," Philippa Strum contended that Justice Ginsberg developed a slightly more substantive standard for constitutional review of equal protection violations in gender discrimination cases (what -Feminism and Philosophy --65 -
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Strum termed a "skeptical scrutiny standard") than the "intermediate scrutiny" standard that the Court had applied in prior cases.
2 By requiring that VMI had to present an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women from roles as citizen-soldiers (which it failed to do), this new standard of scrutiny makes physical sex differences an inappropriate basis for denigrating women or imposing artificial constraints on women's opportunities, while still allowing gender-based classifications for the purpose of compensating women for past discrimination.
Cynthia Harrison argued that constitutional equality is a very limited goal for women, and that Justice Ginsberg's decision in the VMI case has accomplished a virtual equivalent to the ERA. Her paper, "Constitutional Equality for Women: Losing the Battle but Winning the War," argued that the jurisprudence of sex-based discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, along with statutory changes on the federal and state level, has largely fulfilled the expectations of the proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment, making passage of the ERA superfluous. According to Harrison, it is unlikely that constitutional adjudication would have differed materially even with the addition of the ERA to the Constitution, since the forces that shape the Supreme Courtwhich would have been the final arbiter of the ERA's interpretation had it passed-are the same forces that succeeded in defeating the ERA. In addition, in Harrison's view, future decisions will turn more on effective political activism of women and on judicial politics than on a specific constitutional text.
Jane Mansbridge described the disagreement among women's groups about the merit of having an ERA to begin with in her paper, "Whatever Happened to the ERA ? " Feminist legal scholars, for example, had serious concerns about the ERA because of its limitations to formal equality, which did not allow for differences, and interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, which have always been directed to addressing social disadvantage rather than full and equal citizenship rights.
A large cluster of papers in the conference dealt with how the Constitution and its interpretations have addressed discrimination in a variety of forms (in regard to race, class, sexual orientation, as well as gender). With respect to discrimination which is directly gender-based, the panel on "Family Law, Privacy, and the Constitution" focused on how privacy doctrine has created barriers to-as well as opportunities for-enhancing the status of women. Martha Fineman's paper, " What Future for Family Privacy?" (presented by Judith DeCew), engaged in a rethinking of dependency relationships within families, and proposed that responsibility for dependents be restructured from current ideology, in which responsibility for children and the elderly is placed on the family and is, thus, privatized. Instead, on Fineman's proposal, the state, market institutions, and the larger society would play a more substantial role in providing such needed care. Fineman focused on the implications for family privacy that such a shift would entail, and proposed that privacy doctrine also needs to be reconfigured so that the family or care-taking unit has autonomy, in contrast to the current scheme, where the privacy line is drawn at the family. Fineman's paper concluded by suggesting that the law recognize autonomy for family functioning under the rubric of "entity autonomy." My own paper, "Infringements of Women's Constitutional Rights in Religious Lawmaking on Abortion," considered privacy in the very different context of protecting women's privacy and other fundamental constitutional rights ("Citizenship Rights") from infringement by "religious lawmaking" (i.e., laws directly based on or influenced by religious considerations). Focusing on the context of abortion, I described how the Supreme Court's decisions in this area have ignored the ways in which religiously motivated abortion restrictions deprive women of their Citizenship Rights and interests, especially the liberty and autonomy to make fundamental decisions regarding their own lives to the same extent as men are constitutionally enabled, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In contrast to many of the conference papers, which were pessimistic about the prospects of improving the status of women under the Constitution, I proposed a practical legal framework for addressing the constitutional problems that religious lawmaking engenders for women based on an expanded test for Establishment Clause violations. This test would invalidate religiously influenced laws that infringe upon Citizenship Rights when they cannot be fully justified by a secular rationale and/or by a compelling state interest. Liz Schneider's paper, "Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking," considered yet another aspect of constitutional privacy doctrine, namely, how privacy (what Schneider called the "veil of the domestic") has operated to support resistance to changing the law to improve protections for battered women. Schneider pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison (discussed earlier by Resnick) as demonstrating the tenacity of the doctrine of privacy. The link between violence and gender equality was first made in the 1960s, but largely has been lost in the wake of the criminal law focus given to domestic violence in recent years. Schneider suggested that this loss of clarity indicates the importance of reassessing and renewing legal efforts on behalf of battered women, and the need to think broadly about equality, women's citizenship, and how violence prevents women from being full citizens. Martha Nussbaum's paper, "Sex Equality in the Indian Constitution: A Comparative Perspective," from the panel on "International Perspectives," pointed to some of the problems of "internationalizing" western notions of privacy. Using the example of the Indian Supreme Court's upholding Hindu personal law provisions requiring an abused spouse to return to the conjugal bed or face a fine, Nussbaum illustrated how privacy doctrine also has been used to disadvantage women in countries not governed by the US Constitution. However, disagreeing with views such as those of Catharine MacKinnon that equal protection is enough to adequately protect women's rights, Nussbaum argued that privacy rights were important to women, especially in areas such as abortion and divorce, but needed to be reinterpreted as rights to personal autonomy rather than absolute privacy from state regulation.
The session titled "Law, Labor, Women, and Welfare" illuminated a variety of ways in which women continue to be economically disadvantaged in both the "private" context of paid employment and the "public" one of welfare benefits. Joan Williams's presentation on "Women and Economics Revisited" was not so much a constitutional analysis as an economic one, which examined the factors contributing to women's disproportionate share of poverty. With respect to "private wealth," these factors include women's relative economic dependence within marriage, their continuing disproportionate share of childcare and housework, the wage discrimination women face in the workforce, the feminization of poverty attributable to motherhood and especially to motherhood following divorce, and continuing assumptions that women in the home are supported by a husband when the reality has become that male workers are increasingly dependent on women's family work. With respect to "public wealth," one factor contributing to women's poverty is the continuing assumption of the welfare system that women's work is actually leisure time. This assumption has been especially pernicious with the implementation of "welfare to work" programs by states in recent years under the Welfare Reform Act, which fail to take account that many women receiving welfare benefits already work part time as paid workers. In addition, Williams pointed out that government distributions of wealth outside of the safety net of welfare (e.g., social security, tax benefits, unemployment, ERISA and business law benefits), are also highly gendered.
Williams concluded by suggesting a number of measures that could change women's relationship to economic security. These included changing the character of the employer/employee relationship by restructuring workplaces around household work and care of children and elderly members of the household; changing relationships within the family, such as by reallocating family work; and changing the relationship of public and private spheres by restructuring work, ending discrimination against part-time workers and taking steps to socialize dependents. Interestingly, none of these, except perhaps the last, has a direct bearing on constitutional interpretation.
Frances Fox Piven's paper, "The Gender and Class Implications of the Work-Welfare Debate," focused on the disadvantaging effects of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, especially for women. This evidence, Piven suggested, casts a shadow on T.H. Marshall's optimistic view that law is progressive and embodies social rights. Piven detailed how the Welfare Reform Act's shift in welfare administration from federal to state levels has been incredibly disadvantaging for women and children, and contended that there has been a systematic effort not to find out what has happened to those no longer on the welfare rolls-a kind of conspiracy "not to know," such as states failing to collect data. However, indirect evidence suggests that the consequences have been especially harmful to women (e.g., part-time workers earn $.58 to the $1.00 earned by the full-time worker), especially divorced women who are mothers. Eileen Boris's paper, "Race, Gender, and Fair Employment," focused on the anomaly in constitutional law that has permitted women of color to sue for either sex discrimination or race discrimination, but not discrimination on the basis of both race and gender. This anomaly has broken down somewhat but intersectionality is still not legally recognized. The panel on "Race, Gender, and the Law" raised some similar themes about the failure of constitutional law to adequately protect against race or gender discrimination, much less violations of rights that resulted from the intersection of the two. Peggy Davis's paper, "The Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment," considered the family in the context of slavery, and questioned whether the Constitution was reconstructed. The antislavery movement challenged the conditions under which free persons could marry, and claimed that legal marriage should be recognized without the binds of marriage vows. Slaves formed de facto marriages, despite their formal illegality. When slavery began to crumble, slaves grabbed the right to marry. Davis suggested that understanding the antislavery campaign and the slavery experience is important to understanding freedom so that, in turn, we can understand ourselves living under a reconstituted Constitution. Lucie White's paper, "That's What I Growed Up Hearing: Constituting a Ground for Race/Gender Justice in PostApartheid America," raised similar issues to Davis's in the more recent era of Jim Crow America. White focused on the relationship between race and gender identity, and race and gender inequality or subjection, and how we generally assume that these relationships are parallel as opposed to intersecting. She claimed that if we really understood gender identity to be completely interwoven with the history of racial inequality, the task of getting beyond the "insider/outsider box" of "the privileged leaders of emancipation" versus "those who are subordinated" would be easier. White theorized that America is constituted as a racial order, which perhaps ruptured during the Civil War, and then was reconstituted in the Jim Crow era of racial apartheid. In this racial order, the subjectivities of both white and black women were shaped, although it was black men's bodies that were most visually displayed and subjected to that order. White women's race identities have always been danced around rather than faced directly in the context of the project of racial transformation. In White's view, we still have not come to terms with the racial order of our history, or thought through how to unmake it. Susan Sturm's paper dealt primarily with gender rather than race discrimination, in the context of recent legal changes to dealing with employment discrimination-what she termed a "second generation" or "structural approach." Presenting results of her research on corporations developing programs to prevent or remedy gender-based employment discrimination, Sturm noted that since the "first generation" of explicit gender and race employment discrimination cases, which focused on mandating laws enforced by sanctions to address intentional discrimination by particular individuals, courts in "second generation" cases have been developing remedies designed to better address the structural dimensions of employment discrimination, such as the subtle patterns of interaction of sexism or sexual harassment that influence the mentoring and social connections available to new lawyers. This "second generation" approach, in which courts provide for institutional innovation by embracing contextualization and enabling employers to avoid liability by developing solutions to their employment discrimination problems, is yet largely untested, and its accountability and effectiveness have yet to be seen.
The panel on "The Constitution and Sexuality" dealt with issues of constitutional interpretation regarding sexual orientation. Again, a lively difference of opinion emerged between the panelists and the participants on appropriate and effective strategies. Edward Stein's paper, "Evaluating the Sex-Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights," took the controversial position that even though sexism and homophobia may be intimately related in some respects, there are significant differences between them which make it problematic to treat them together under laws banning sex discrimination. He argued that because of the problems involved in making the sex discrimination argument with respect to discrimination on the basis of orientation, it should be done only with caution, and only when coupled with alternative arguments for lesbian and gay rights. His position met with a number of questions and comments from audiences members, who suggested that continuing to pursue the sex discrimination argument was more fruitful than attempting to gain independent constitutional rights for gays and lesbians in a still largely homophobic and hostile society.
Similarly, David Richards's paper, "The Right to Privacy and Gay/Lesbian Sexuality: Beyond Decriminalization to Equal Recognition," took a controversial position in arguing that denying gays and lesbians the right to marr y was dehumanizing, and thus in violation of fundamental human rights to liberty and treatment with human dignity. By establishing that there is no compelling secular state purpose served by laws that discriminate against gays and lesbians (but instead, only dehumanizing prejudices), and that each traditional ground used to justify the condemnation of homosexuality has been rejected independently in other areas of law, Richards argued such unions should be ruled to be valid and constitutionally protected. Sylvia Law's paper on commercial sex work was also provocative in contending that the shift from active support for the rights of commercial sex workers to the disappearance of this issue from the feminist agenda was due to several reasons, including the rise of the Moral Majority as a dominant voice in American public life; the rise of HIV (even though transmission from female to male is very difficult, and there has been no reported case of HIV contracted from prostitution in the United States); the "pornography wars" among feminists; and the lack of feminist support for issues relating to the "criminal class." The Constitution has not been of much relevance to the issue of women's exploitation in commercial sex work because it mostly applies to state actors rather than individuals, and has emphasized negative liberties rather than positive rights.
This problem was also addressed in Carol Gould's paper, "Women's Human Rights and the US Constitution: Initiating a Dialogue," in the panel on "The US Constitution in International Context." In arguing that the US Constitution does not in most cases measure up favorably against international and foreign laws in protecting women's human rights, Gould noted that, whereas the US Constitution protects primarily only civil and political rights, international human rights documents also attempt to protect social and economic rights, which are fundamental for women. She concluded that although there are key problems in both frameworks (including the division between public and private spheres, the inapplicability of the protections in most cases against non-state actors, the dilemma of whether women should receive "equal or special treatment," and the omission of a role for care ethics), and in some instances, the US Constitution actually protects greater protection for women's rights than international law, international protections are better, at least theoretically, and in most cases, they provide lessons for how the US Constitution needs to be modified in order to adequately protect women's human rights.
In sum, the papers presented at the conference provided a rich and provocative array of analyses and perspectives on women and the US Constitution. By the end of the sessions, many problems with the Constitution and its interpretations had been revealed, but also many examples where the Constitution had served to improve women's status, most notably in the spheres of privacy and formal legal equality, and far less so, if at all, with respect to full social and economic equality in the "public sphere" and freedom from disadvantage in the "private sphere." The result of the conference was to make at least this participant hopeful that, despite all of its flaws, the Constitution continues to hold some promise for realizing women's full personhood and citizenship rights.
Endnotes
1. "Originalism" is the use of historical authoritative exemplars, such as the proponents of the "original intent" of the Constitution's framers; "conventionalism" is the view that there is no need to justify the Constitution or its interpretations; "naturalism" is the premise that there exists an independent moral reality under the Constitution that can be used to interpret the Constitution, a view taken by Ronald Dworkin, for example; and "constructivism," is the notion that the Constitution both needs to be, and should be, interpreted in accordance with changing times. 2. The Supreme Court adopted a "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state interest" test to assess regulations that distinguish among persons on the basis of "invidious classifications" of race and national origin, but has refused to use the same standard in sex and gender discrimination cases, on the rationale that some such classifications are legitimate since men and women are not always "similarly situated" because of biological differences such as reproductive capacity, pregnancy, childbearing, and so on.
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Fitting In? Negotiating Our Places in the Profession
Tracy Bowell
University of Waikato, New Zealand
Introduction
This paper draws on the results of a research project conducted during 1998-99, which aimed to provide a detailed picture of the experiences of women employed in philosophy departments in English-speaking universities.
1
Using a questionnaire and a series of interviews, women provided information and narratives about their research interests, their career development and their experiences as a minority in what remains a male-dominated field. The questionnaire was intended to collect both quantitative and qualitative information, the former mostly demographic. The qualitative questions focussed on research interests and respondents' perception of their relation, if any, to gender. Respondents were also asked about perceived professional advantage and disadvantage on grounds of gender. The questionnaire received a respectable response rate, averaging 40% of questionnaires returned across all the countries. In addition, I conducted interviews with women in the US and the UK (chosen with a view to a balance of age, status, interests, and to some extent, location) with the intention of gaining more detailed narratives that could also function as case studies.
So who are these women philosophers? 73% of respondents were from the USA while the UK and Ireland provided 12%, Canada 8%, Australia 5% and New Zealand and South Africa 1% each. Respondents represent the range of age and experience that is found among women in the profession: 3% being in the range 20-29, 38% in the range 30-39, 27% in the range 40-49, 25% 50-59 and 7% 60-70+; 34% of respondents were employed at the Lecturer/Assistant Professor level, 30% at the Senior Lecturer/Associate Professor level and 27% at the level of Full Professor, with 6% of respondents falling into categories such as Research Fellow. Two thirds of respondents have tenure, a quarter were in tenure-track appointments, while the remainder were on fixed-term contracts. Respondents also provided details of their research interests. Perhaps not unexpectedly, women are well represented in ethics (48% of respondents), applied ethics (31%) and political philosophy (31%) and less well represented in logic (10%), philosophy of language (20%), and metaphysics (26%).
2
Detailed responses to the qualitative questions reveal that a number of issues and experiences are common to the professional lives of many women philosophers. This paper summarises just one of those: the effect that women's solo and minority status in many departments and in the profession as a whole has on our ability simply to be philosophers. 
Misfit Philosophers
Although there are more women employed as academic philosophers than there were a decade ago and the visibility of women in the profession has increased accordingly, women continue to comprise only a small minority of the profession. 4 This disproportionate level of participation is not unusual in academia or in the professions more widely. Philosophy, however, is something of an extreme case, particularly within the humanities, and it is very likely that at least some of the problems and inequities that women face are exacerbated by our extreme minority status in philosophy.
In what follows, I focus on questions of epistemic credibility and authority and the contortions of identity that some women who are philosophers feel obliged to perform if they are to be taken to count as philosophers by their colleagues and their students. Just being a woman philosopher requires a set of intricate negotiations both with oneself and with others. Just as philosophy has historically failed to find a place for women as its subject, so it denies women space to do philosophy. One tries to be a philosopher, but finds that one doesn't quite fit and isn't fully accepted by ones peers because one doesn't fulfil the (male) philosopher norm. Women are unlikely philosophers -"misfits" as one respondent put it -who must negotiate space for themselves in philosophical discourses in a way that the majority of male colleagues appear not to have to.
5
A not insignificant part of this on-going negotiation is social. Minorities in most professional settings -seminar, staff meeting, conference session -women frequently reported feeling awkward in these environments and finding themselves forced to negotiate gender relationships while attempting to participate in philosophical conversation. This is especially disadvantageous when so much philosophical dialogue takes place in informal conversation with our peers. As this UK interviewee puts it, When you talk philosophy it's a kind of intimate conversation and that has always been difficultkeeping it where you want the intimacy of talking to this man about philosophy, but you don't want it to signify a different kind of intimacy (Senior Lecturer, UK).
Drawing the attention of one's colleagues to such tensions can marginalise one even further, as this respondent reports:
At a small conference, where the principal ingredient of social bonding was sex-laden small talk, I felt excluded and when I tried to object, I felt I was being a drag on social solidarity (Assistant Professor, USA).
Most male philosophers are apparently unaware of these social tensions. This is illustrated by a respondent who recounts how she was (unintentionally) excluded from philosophical conversation when a discussion had continued until the group reached the men's room, at which point everyone else had gone on and she had been left wondering how the discussion ended. The job interview, always a source of anxiety anyway, provides a further site for negotiation of women's role as philosophers. As an interviewee remarked, There are so many awkward dynamics-like when you go out to dinner and the conversation becomes uncomfortable because a bunch of the guys in the department where you're interviewing-start talking about other women philosophers in a way that's clearly sexist or talk about the way these woman look or the way these women dress (Associate Professor, USA).
Appearance is just one characteristic that serves to mark women out as different from the philosopher norm and therefore, for some colleagues, not entirely credible as philosophers. One female characteristic that operates as a disadvantageous marker of difference is the tone of our voices. In addition to feeling themselves more frequently interrupted and ignored than their male peers, women feel differentiated as soon as they begin to speak: I sometimes think it is a disadvantage having a high voice that contrasts with the dominant male tones of the discussion. Especially in my early days, I felt men switched off when they heard the shift of tone (Senior Lecturer, UK).
To speak while a woman is to had have conferred upon one an automatic status. It is to speak with a softer voice and from a suspicious place (Associate Professor, USA).
The soft tone of the woman's voice locates it at the margins of philosophical discourse even before anything has been said so that, thus placed, for those who hear this difference, the speaker's epistemic authority is undermined.
Women philosophers' minority or solo status in departments and in the profession more generally can result in an isolation, which lays at the root of many our difficulties. Women's comparison class has an impact on professional choices and development. It is natural and rational to make comparisons with similar others. Thus, women are more likely to compare their achievements with those of other women rather than with those of men; since this is where they expect to see the most similarity with themselves. 6 In a discipline such as philosophy where the number of women is so small, the available comparison class is correspondingly meagre. As questionnaire responses demonstrated, it is common for a woman to be the only woman in her department, resulting in a lack of role models both among our peers and for women students. As one respondent commented:
As a young woman it is difficult to visualise yourself doing something with no role models (Associate Professor, USA).
So our minority status is perpetuated because our lack of visibility and the lack of role models for keen students who consider graduate studies and perhaps a career in academic philosophy makes philosophy an unattractive prospect. It doesn't appear to allow a great deal of space for women to flourish intellectually and it is hard, as a student, to conceive of oneself being a philosopher.
Finding a Place: Survival Strategies
Part of overcoming this feeling of being a "misfit" involves demonstrating that being a philosopher and a woman is not, as several respondents put it, "an oxymoron." So how does one best position and present oneself so as to find a place as a woman in philosophy, albeit often an uncomfortable place? A common strategy is the erasure of enough of one's identity as a woman to normalise oneself according to the (male) philosopher norm. One respondent wrote, I have really felt that being a woman in philosophy is very existential -there were few if any role models and one had to "male oneself " (Assistant Professor, USA).
Another wrote, I have been very good at keeping up with the aggressive, combative style of philosophy -which I do think of as "male" -but at the cost of being very uncomfortable with myself (Assistant Professor, USA).
Making oneself more masculine and consequently more at home as a philosopher can have costs for one's identity: one no longer feels at home with oneself. At times the expectations of one's colleagues on the one hand that one will behave as a woman should -nurturing, cooperative and obedient to male authority -while on the other that one will behave as a philosopher should -authoritative, confrontational, confident -require a woman philosopher to occupy apparently opposing social spaces simultaneously.
Even when women have attained positions of authority and power in relation to their colleagues, stereotypical expectations remain:
As chair of my department I constantly feel at a disadvantage as a woman. My senior male colleagues (well, even my junior male colleagues) expect a lot more of me than they would a man in terms of flexibility, favors, time and support. It's like I'm their wife. I hate it (Professor, USA).
In order to escape the expectations of the nurturing mom or wife stereotype, some women philosophers, like women in other professions, report the reluctant adoption of an alternative yet still stereotypical space:
I like to keep a reputation as a bitch. So I'm very strict about assignments, I'm very strict about when people can come to my office, I'm very strict about if I say "no" to something I mean it -I'm not happy with having to do that but it does keep a little bit more of a boundary than I know there would be if I didn't maintain that (Associate Professor, USA).
Here, again, we see manifested an alienation between self and professional self that some women endure in order simply to be philosophers. Despite strategies conceived to avoid the pitfalls of conforming to the caring stereotype, frequently the space that women have made for themselves in philosophy remains shaped by expectations ensuing from those stereotypes. Ironically, a woman's solo status in her department can mark out a clearly delineated space for her among her colleagues:
My status as the token woman perhaps gives me a profile in the department that I would not otherwise have. I have a place, I belong, I am needed, I am "The woman" (Assistant Professor, USA).
Beyond Survival: Claiming Space
When women do find intellectual community, the position of the woman philosopher is far less problematised and the question "How can one be a woman philosopher?" becomes virtually redundant. When asked to comment on the advantages of being a woman philosopher, a common theme among respondents was the ways in which their work has been inspired and shaped by being part of a community of women scholars. This sense of empowerment and the extent to which it nurtures achievement is captured by the following contribution:
I helped to start a Feminist Theory Reading Group in graduate school which became sort of a "hot" place to be -some of our distinguished male professors began to ask us about it, said they were hearing good things about this group. And the intellectual companionship of the women in the group and our sense that we had started something that people were beginning (just beginning) to take seriously was a professionally formative experience. I continue to relish the company, in person or via email, of those women… At the 1997 APA I was on a panel on the topic "Is the Language of Rights Good for Women?" which included Martha Nussbaum and Catharine Mackinnon. They had to move us to a bigger room and it was jam-packed -with men as well as women. LOTS of women, professors and graduate students, asked questions. One grad student came up to me afterwards with tears in her eyes to say what a meaningful experience this had been for her. And later, I was in the Ladies Room with about a dozen or so other women engaged in a heated discussion when suddenly I stopped and said, "Isn't it wonderful that the most interesting philosophical debates are happening in the Ladies Room?" (Associate Professor, USA).
FEMINISM
So, despite the downbeat nature of many women's narratives, women's minority status in philosophy can be used to creative advantage and can contribute to women's success in the discipline. Women in philosophy are in the position of outsiders within. Although, we don't completely fit the philosopher norm, we can, often through the strategies of negotiation examined here, normalise ourselves sufficiently to gain varying degrees of acceptance into the profession and its discourses. However, as the contributions quoted demonstrate, while permitted entry to those discourses, the place that women occupy once they are "in" still tends to be somewhat marginal. This can be beneficial intellectually, however, because it makes for a more distanced and impartial standpoint on discourses and concepts that conventionally have been held to be nonnegotiable in philosophy. Wielding less power, women have staked fewer elements of their identities in such discourses and concepts and consequently are better placed to perform critical analyses of them and, where appropriate, to find alternatives that supersede them. The point is well illustrated by the recognition that, Outsider within status also means that women philosophers tend to be sensitive to the ways in which difference, power, and the social injustices that can result from their relations are a fertile and valid site for philosophical work. Women's position as outsider within has provided a starting point for a broadening of philosophy's boundaries to include enquiry about gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, and disability. When asked about the advantages of being a woman in philosophy, respondents frequently commented on the way in which their position privileged them in this fashion, enabling them to recognise philosophical significance where others hadn't. For example:
Philosophically I think being a woman and a lesbian (especially the latter) is a real advantage because I have a different perspective on things from that of straight white males. I see philosophical significance where they miss it sometimes (Professor, USA).
Concluding Remarks
These narratives demonstrate the ways in which women have succeeded in claiming space for themselves within academic philosophy. Women's identity as philosophers, however, remains problematised; on the one hand because of a tendency among colleagues and students to fail to grant us full epistemic credibility, and on the other because of the alienation that can develop between our selves and our professional selves. More positively, this somewhat marginalised space has provided a productive site for philosophical enquiry and also a communal space in which women are free simply to do philosophy without having to negotiate their position as bone fide philosophers. This space has not been claimed without a struggle; it is a struggle that continues and that deters talented women from pursuing philosophy as graduate students and as an academic career. 7 Endnotes 1. Obviously a starting assumption of the project is that our identities and lives are shaped by the socio-cultural forces of gender; hence, my interest in women rather than female philosophers. Women who felt that gender had little to do with either their identity or their professional and intellectual lives were free to comment to that effect, as, indeed, a number did. A more complete picture of these philosophers' lives would also take into account further shapers of identity and markers of difference such as race, sexuality, class, and disability; and, again, a number of respondents commented on ways in which their professional and intellectual lives were influenced in these respects. Clearly, there is great potential for further work in this regard. 2. Respondents were asked to tick boxes indicating each of their research interests. There was no limit on the number they could indicate and they were not asked to rank them. Work I have in progress attempts to explain why women tend to gravitate to and from these particular areas of the discipline. 3. Studies such as this run the risk of drawing conclusions on the basis of what are, essentially, single anecdotes. I have been careful to identify an issue that was mentioned in a majority of responses and to quote from those responses only when context made it clear that they were relevant to the issue. In using responses in this way, I hope to have allowed these women's narratives to speak for themselves. 4. Up-to-date statistics are hard to come by. The Society for Women in Philosophy website provides figures for 1992 from the 1996 US Digest of Educational Statistics. These show 13.3% of people employed in US philosophy departments (in all positions including part-time and limited contract) were women. See http:// www.uh.edu/~cfreelan/SWIP/stats.html. Here in New Zealand things are somewhat better with women making up 22% of our small philosophical community. 5. Although marginalised within the profession, as academics, we do occupy a privileged social space. Naomi Scheman discusses this point in her "Forms of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground", in Sluga, H., & Stern, G., eds., The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 90 and note. 6. See Valian, V., Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), an analytical review of the major research on gender disparity in professional advancement, which includes a chapter on academia. 7. I would like to thank all the women who participated in this project by way of completing questionnaires and giving interviews and Dawn Marsh, who provided invaluable research assistance.
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Philosophy and the Future of Women's Studies
Nancy J. Holland
Hamline University
Recently I was asked, not for the first time, about the future of Women's Studies. The relatively well-informed questioner understood that a large part of the vision on which Women's Studies has been built is the possibility of a time when scholarship for, by, and about women is so well integrated into all disciplines that there might appear to be no more need for Women's Studies as a separate academic enterprise. After serving a total of seven years as Director of Women's Studies at Hamline University, and four years as Coordinator of the Associated Colleges of the Twin Cities consortial Women's Studies major, I think I may finally have an answer to the question of the future of the discipline. My answer would be based on two strong analogies I find between the field of Women's Studies and its role in the academy, on the one hand, and my home discipline of Philosophy and its role in the academy, on the other. These unexpected similarities between the oldest academic discipline (philosophy, after all, was what they taught at the original Academy) and one of the youngest can offer, I believe, some interesting insights into Women's Studies as a discipline and into its future.
The first strong analogy I find between Philosophy and Women's Studies is that both are disciplines in which faculty routinely engage in transformative teaching. By this I mean teaching that is not just informative, although of course it is that as well, but that is intended in part to change the ways in which our students look at themselves and their world. In Philosophy, this transformative power of our teaching has two main sources. The first is simply the teaching of critical thinking, which is central throughout the philosophy curriculum and not only in logic or other "critical thinking" courses. Once students learn to look for the reasons behind their beliefs or their actions, and to investigate the logic behind those reasons, it is almost inevitable that their way of looking at the world will change, even if only a little or very slowly. The second is that Philosophy teaches the texts and ideas on which much of our society's current understanding of the world is based (Hobbes and natural rights, Locke and democratic liberalism, J. S. Mill and free inquiry, etc.), so that a critical examination of those texts naturally entails, although it doesn't always result in, a critical examination of many core beliefs of our society. Thus, even in courses far from ethics, with its obvious implications for how students live, one of the main results of teaching Philosophy is to enable them to change their lives. And this is not some radical new phenomenon-changing lives was what Socrates and Plato meant to do over two millennia ago.
Similarly, in Women's Studies teaching we not only allow students' lived experiences as men and women in this society into the classroom, but we also illuminate the larger social structures that shape those experiences and, in so doing, offer our students a different perspective on them, a new way to understand their own lives. At the same time, Women's Studies courses also frequently address the historical conditions which created the social structures of gender (and often race and class as well), and the texts that mark that history, which allows our students to see these structures not only as contingent, rather than natural and necessary, but more importantly, as changeable, as subject in some measure to individual and collective choice. In this way, we hope to give students the tools needed to transform their lives, the University, and the larger society.
Such transformative teaching in both Philosophy and Women's Studies means that we as teachers sometimes meet substantial resistance because of students' (often robust) reluctance to look critically at themselves and the world around them. This resistance raises important questions about the meaning of student evaluations of teaching in Women's Studies and Philosophy courses, especially since the best teachers will be those most likely to challenge their students not only intellectually, but personally as well.
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This resistance also raises issues about evaluating programs by measuring "student outcomes" because, while informative teaching shows up immediately, the most important outcomes of transformative teaching may not be evident until several years after graduation. Finally, this resistance often means that our teaching can be emotionally draining and that faculty who do this kind of work require, especially early in their careers, a strongly supportive community of peers who share, not necessarily their views, but their dedication to the transformative enterprise.
While this need for community can be addressed directly in Philosophy departments through judicious hiring, it requires a far more determined effort in Women's Studies, where faculty must be begged, borrowed, or stolen from established departments and where the program most often has no say in the actual hiring process. Thus, one key task for a Director of Women's Studies, above and beyond the usual duties of a department chair, is the creation and, perhaps more importantly, the maintenance of a community in which Women's Studies scholars/teachers and their students can flourish, despite the challenges, both internal and external, that our work can create.
The second strong analogy I would like to point out between Philosophy and Women's Studies is that both are areas of inquiry that I would characterize as having a dual role in the University. On the one hand, they are individual areas like any other, each with its own content, methods, and preferred teaching styles. On the other hand, I also think that, when done well, they both diffuse their subject matters across various disciplines through a process in which, by their very nature, they transform the University as they transform its students. This is precisely what led to the original question about the future of Women's Studies, but a similar process is just as evident in Philosophy, which over the last 2500 years has spawned most of the other disciplines: mathematics, theology, the physical sciences, and most recently, the social sciences.
In Women's Studies, this is called the "dispersion" model, through which research for, by, and about women slowly moves out over the disciplines, changing not only their content, but also their methodology and their selfunderstanding. Successful dispersion means that Women's History courses come to be replaced or complemented by the inclusion of women into all history courses, Women and Labor courses by Labor Economics courses that include Women's labor from the start, Women and Literature courses by the inclusion of women as writers, readers, and theorists across the curriculum, and so on. Women's Studies is paradigmatically interdisciplinary and profoundly unlike Philosophy in this way, because it has existed from the beginning as a corrective to existing disciplines, whereas Philosophy has spawned new disciplines that have in turned "corrected" it.
Moreover, Philosophy has traditionally reacted to its own dispersion by contracting further and further into its center, while Women's Studies is radically decentering, of both itself and the University as a whole. Not only does Women's Studies open itself up to the traditional disciplines in the process of opening them up to women's experiences and women's scholarship, thereby moving from center to margin and from there into the center of other academic work, but it also opens itself up to its own Other, in the current sense of the term. That is, it opens itself to both experiences and scholarship that arise from its margins, in the lives and discourse of women from communities of color, lesbians, immigrant women, women from different religious groups, older women, differently abled women, working class women, transgendered individuals. At Hamline, the vast majority of courses that satisfy our Cultural Breadth requirement are Women's Studies courses, but I think that is far from the only case in which Women's Studies has become a major avenue for decentering the entire University curriculum from its traditional focus on the achievements and concerns of a relatively small, highly localized segment of humanity.
My vision of the future of Women's Studies is, then, one in which more and more of what is now considered our subject matter will become ever yday discourse in the traditional disciplines, while Women's Studies itself becomes more like Philosophy, that is, increasingly concerned with the detailed study of its own canonical texts and with problems at the level of meta-theory. This is why I believe that another main task for any Director of Women's Studies, again, above and beyond the duties of other department chairs, is to build and maintain strong relationships with the representatives of the traditional disciplines. This is needed, in part, because Women's Studies is an interdisciplinary undertaking that, even at large institutions, must share its core of permanent faculty with other departments. But we also need to keep communication open with disciplines in which Women's Studies courses are not now being taught, and may never be taught, in order to facilitate our long-term goal of transforming the whole University curriculum. This is as true -perhaps more true -at large multiversities as it is at institutions like Hamline, where departments are small and the total number of faculty are relatively few.
For me, a successful Women's Studies program is one that combines theory with both solid empirical work and models for feminist social action, providing our students with the tools to change themselves and their world. Philosophy has always done this, even as it created specialized ways of accomplishing this goal through the creation of new disciplines. I think Women's Studies must also follow Philosophy in this way by always being prepared for, and encouraging, its own diffusion across the curriculum. This transformation of the entire curriculum is inevitable, I think, as academic disciplines increasingly come to realize that without including women in what they do, without doing and teaching good research on, by, and for women, with all our multiple lives and identities, they simply aren't producing good research -or good teaching -at all. Then Women's Studies will not disappear, but will be able, as Philosophy has, to recenter itself and become, not just another discipline among others, but a central part of the academy, the site of continuing critical analysis that can lead to personal, institutional, and political transformation. 
Reviewed by Alison Jaggar
University of Colorado
" Women in much of the world lack support for the fundamental functions of a human life. They are less well nourished than men, less healthy, more vulnerable to physical violence and sexual abuse." These opening words of Martha Nussbaum's Women and Human Development are followed by several pages describing the neglect, discrimination and abuse to which women are subjected in many parts of the developing world, notably Asia, North Africa, and Latin America. In view of the enormity of this situation, Nussbaum recommends that feminist philosophers should turn their attention away from "problems peculiar to middle-class women" and refocus on "the urgent needs and interests of women in the developing world" (Nussbaum 2000:7) .
In order to address the problem of women's inequality in the developing world, Nussbaum believes that it is necessary for feminist philosophers to adopt a universalistic approach, "committed to cross-cultural norms of justice, equality, and rights, and at the same time sensitive to local particularity" (Nussbaum 2000:7) . She argues that her own capabilities approach offers a set of universal values suitable for acceptance as a global standard able to condemn gender injustice wherever it arises.
The centerpiece of Nussbaum's approach is a list of ten human capabilities, explained as abilities to function in certain core areas of life. The concept of "capabilities" was developed originally by Amartya Sen but Nussbaum's conception is different from Sen's in several respects (Nussbaum 2000:11-15) . Nussbaum insists that the various items on her list are quite separate and that all are equally fundamental. "We cannot satisfy the need for one of them by giving a larger amount of another one. All are of central importance and all are distinct in quality" (Nussbaum 2000:81) . She asserts that the list is grounded in a basic intuition of individual human dignity, worth, and agency that Westerners associate with Kant but which also has broad cross-cultural resonance (Nussbaum 2000:71-2). Although her list is extremely wideranging, Nussbaum presents it "not (as) a complete account of the good or of human flourishing, but (as) a political account, specifying certain capacities, liberties, and opportunities that have value in any plan of life that citizens may otherwise choose" (Nussbaum 2000:148) . In this respect, it resembles Rawls's list of primary social goods (Nussbaum 2000:74) . Nussbaum claims that her list of capabilities has sufficient breadth of appeal that it "can be endorsed for political purposes, as the moral basis of central constitutional guarantees, by people who otherwise have very different views of what a complete good life for a human would be" (Nussbaum 2000:74) . She believes that the political conception of the capabilities provides a set of universal values which constitutes an alternative to "cultural relativism." Nussbaum regards relativism as a philosophically naive view too often used to rationalize injustices to women in the developing world.
Women and Human Development is divided into four substantial chapters. The first chapter defends the project of seeking and advocating universal values, arguing that such advocacy is compatible with respect for the diversity of local cultures and that it is not necessarily paternalistic or an "exercise in colonial or class domination" (Nussbaum 2000:35) . Nussbaum also presents her conception of the capabilities in this chapter, and explains why she thinks it is needed to supplement human rights, which many would regard as values that are already universal in the sense of being accepted globally. She proposes that the universal values incorporated in the political conception of the capabilities be taken as "the underpinnings of basic political principles that can be embodied in constitutional guarantees" (Nussbaum 2000:74) , and she discusses the measures that states committed to the capabilities may legitimately take in order to encourage states that have not yet embraced the capabilities to incorporate them into their constitutions.
The second chapter of Women and Human Development offers Nussbaum's moral justification of the capabilities. She argues at length that, in a non-ideal society, the capabilities cannot be justified by any method that relies on people's existing desires or preferences, since such desires and preferences are shaped by or "adapted to" unjust social circumstances and therefore are likely to be corrupted or mistaken. Because people cannot be trusted to value the capabilities, if they live in societies where the capabilities are not already guaranteed, Nussbaum contends that the political conception of the capabilities cannot currently be justified either via utilitarianism or via a Kantian proceduralist method, such as Rawlsian contractarianism or Habermasian discourse ethics. She argues that no preference-based method of moral justification is reliable because existing preferences are likely to be adapted to an unjust status quo. " [T] o consult all actual desires, including the corrupt or mistaken, when we justify the list of basic entitlements and opportunities itself would put the political conception, and the liberties of citizens, on much too fragile a foundation" (Nussbaum 2000:160) . Nussbaum therefore recommends that the political conception of the capabilities be justified by way of the "nonPlatonic substantive-good" method, which "goes directly and forthrightly to the good (and the right), taking an unambiguously clear stand on the need for these items" (Nussbaum 2000:149) .
In the last two chapters of Women and Human Development, Nussbaum seeks to demonstrate the usefulness of the capabilities approach by applying it to two practical issues. The first is the question of how the state should address conflicts between religious liberty and sex equality; the second is the question of how the family should be shaped by public policy, and what other affiliative institutions the state should support. Nussbaum's answer to the first question is that the protection of the central capabilities provides a compelling state interest for constraining religious practices that discriminate against women. In answer to the second question, she argues that families are not "natural" but are creations of state action that should be supported by the state only insofar as they protect the central capabilities. Institutions similar to the family that promote the same human capabilities, particularly the capability for love, should receive the same support from the state (Nussbaum 2000:279).
Nussbaum's new book provides further elaboration of the theory of capabilities on which she has been working since the late 1980s. Earlier versions of the theory emphasized its Aristotelian heritage; but the most recent version highlights its liberalism. Nussbaum now gives "a more prominent place" than previously to "traditional rights and liberties" asserting that these are valuable not only instrumentally but also in their own right because "[t]he political liberties have a central importance in making well-being human" (Nussbaum 2000:96) . The capabilities approach is also liberal in that it is non-aggregative: it treats "each person as an end and as a source of agency and worth in her own right" (Nussbaum 2000:69) . In addition, it is liberal in that it is not "dictatorial about the good" (Nussbaum 2000:69) . Despite postulating an ideal of human functioning, it does not insist that (adult) citizens actually function in any particular way: "Capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political goal" (Nussbaum 2000:87, emphasis in original). Finally, Nussbaum believes that the capabilities approach is liberal in that "people may sign on to this conception as the freestanding moral core of a political conception, without accepting any particular metaphysical view of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any particular view of the person or of human nature" (Nussbaum 2000:76) .
Women and Human Development offers an original contribution to discussion of the urgent problems confronted by women in the global South. It is written in a lively, informal style and its tone is more conciliatory than the tone of Nussbaum's earlier work on this topic, which was often scathing in its criticism of the "cultural relativism" that Nussbaum attributed to postmodern and postcolonial theorists. Nussbaum illustrates her points by frequent references to India, a country of which she has considerable knowledge, and especially by reference to two women, Vasanti and Jayamma, whose stories form a vivid counterpoint to Nussbaum's more abstract arguments. Despite its considerable merits, however, the book does have some problems.
Although it is presented as a contribution to feminist philosophy, Women and Human Development contains few references to the work of other feminist philosophers; indeed, it even implies, mistakenly, that feminist philosophers have largely ignored the issues that the book addresses. Nussbaum's neglect of feminist philosophical work on development is unfortunate because attention to it might have strengthened her own work. For instance, feminist rights theorists have exposed masculine biases implicit in traditional interpretations of a number of human rights and have proposed new understandings of those rights designed to ensure that many of the injustices suffered by women in the global South become recognized as violations of human rights. A consideration of this feminist literature might have led Nussbaum to provide more careful arguments in support of her currently unconvincing claim that the political conception of the capabilities is required to supplement the inadequacies of a human rights approach to global justice.
The book's central problems, in my view, stem from Nussbaum's distrust of people's existing preferences. This distrust has damaging consequences for her accounts both of moral justification and of how the capabilities should be implemented politically. As we have seen, Nussbaum contends that "adaptive preferences" make preference-based methods of moral justification unreliable and that the capabilities should therefore be justified by the non-Platonic substantive-good method. Although preference-based methods of justification certainly are not without problems, Nussbaum's alternative method is even less desirable because it is at core authoritarian. Defining the (political) good "forthrightly" in terms of capabilities, this method allows disagreement to be dismissed on the ground that it expresses desires that are "corrupt and mistaken." The method is thus disrespectful of others' autonomy and ultimately, despite Nussbaum's disclaimer, it is "dictatorial about the good." A parallel problem is evident in Nussbaum's recommendation that economic and political pressure be exerted on countries that do not accept the political conception of the capabilities. This recommendation conflicts with her overt respect for the democratic processes of sovereign states. Thus, despite Nussbaum's stated commitment to liberalism, some central lines of argument in Women and Human Development are paternalistic and anti-democratic and so fundamentally illiberal.
Globalizing
Feminist Bioethics: Crosscultural Perspectives. Edited by Rosemarie Tong, Gwen Anderson, and Aida Santos (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001) 
Reviewed by Sonya Charles
Michigan State University
After numerous critiques of essentialist notions of "woman," it seems strange to find feminists discussing "globalizing" feminist bioethics. Is such a thing desirable? If so, can it be done in non-oppressive and non-essentializing way? These are the questions addressed by the essays included in Globalizing Feminist Bioethics, and -according to the various authors -the answer to both questions is positive.
As a collection of essays culled from an International Network of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics conference, this book began with feminists gathering from various countries to discuss issues, methodologies, and concerns. As such, it includes essays by authors from a variety of countries: the United States, Canada, Brazil, Columbia, Philippines, Argentina, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Africa. Still one could ask what does it mean to "globalize" feminist bioethics? Susan Sherwin and Rosemarie Tong take on this question in the two introductory essays.
In "Feminist Reflections on the Role of Theories in a Global Bioethics," Sherwin shows how current debates in ethical theory apply in a global context. Using a metaphorical approach, Sherwin reviews three possible ways to conceptualize the role of theories: as a foundation, as possible frameworks, and as potential lenses. Rejecting the foundationalist approach as not useful and possibly harmful, Sherwin focuses on the usefulness of the frameworks and lenses metaphors. The theories as frameworks metaphor is helpful in that it allows the use of different frameworks for different circumstances; however, Sherwin ultimately settles on the lenses metaphor as the most beneficial way to conceptualize the place of theory. Thinking of theories as lenses not only allows us to use more than one, but encourages us to do so. We often have different "lenses" for different projects -such as reading glasses for reading the newspaper or binoculars for birdwatching. Also, lenses can be multiple and overlapping -think of bi-or trifocals. In this way, theory is not oppressive, one theory does not dominate, and we are actually encouraged to seek out new and creative approaches.
Perhaps more directly concerned with western domination, Tong looks at what exactly we mean by a "global" bioethics. In "Is a Global Bioethics Possible As Well As Desirable?" she explores the pros and cons of recent feminist work on the issue of power. Tong defines global feminist bioethics as a sort of bioethics that accounts for diversity in people and cultures, recognizes our mutual reliance on planetary resources, and opposes any structures or systems that perpetuate human oppression (especially of women). Tong goes on to argue that much recent work has sacrificed the goal of ending oppression for the sake of diversity. " [A] n overemphasis on the ideal of difference gradually has resulted in feminists' increasing inability to formulate policies aimed at expanding women's freedom and well-being in a just manner. In the name of respect for difference, powerfocused feminists fail to confront some social injustices for fear of 'imposing' their moral views on a culture different than their own" (Tong et al. 2001:29) . Instead, Tong argues that we should work to let all voices be heard and then move toward consensus through a sort of collective reflection. Her model for this is Alison Jaggar's feminist practical dialogue. However, in the end, Tong also emphasizes that dialogue should not take precedence over action, and calls for feminists to "get serious" about distributive justice.
These introductory pieces set the themes for most of the essays that follow. For example, of the other three essays in this first section on theoretical perspectives one speaks directly to Tong's essay, one speaks directly to Sherwin's, and one sort of merges the discussions of the two. In "Feminism and Genetic Nursing," Gwen Anderson, Rita Monsen, and Mary Rorty look at the issue of power and policy in the workings of health care teams. These authors call for the creation of transdisciplinar y teams in which all team members have equal decision-making capacity and are encouraged to share their diversity of methodological backgrounds. In this way, the transdisciplinary approach is a sort of model for feminist practical dialogue. In response to Sherwin, Leonardo de Castro plays with various theoretical lenses in "Kagandahang Loob: A Filipino Concept of Feminine Bioethics." Finally, Debora Diniz and Ana Velez address both issues in "Feminist Bioethics: The Emergence of the Oppressed." They use various theoretical approaches to show how specific theories -such as "principlism" -have been transferred to "peripheral" countries and utilized in detrimental ways. However, the reason these theories are mis-appropriated is because of the power differential: The male dominated medical community has uncritically adopted this sort of "principlist" approach, whereas including the perspective of less dominant groups would help correct this oversight.
The collection's next two sections deal with more specific issues; however, the themes of the first section are not forgotten. For example, Loretta Kopelman discusses the uses and abuses of "cultural/ethical" relativism in the debates over female genital mutilation. Also, other authors introduce a dialogue between western and nonwestern ways of thought. Leonardo de Castro's first section essay on feminine ethics in the Philippines is relevant to the discussions in this section, too, given its analysis of how "care ethicists," such as Nel Noddings, complement and help inform the Filipino concept of "kagandahang loob." At the same time, Vangie Bergum and Mary Ann Bendfeld show how nonwestern concepts of the body can offer useful alternatives in thinking about issues like the maternal/fetal relationship.
In part two -Reproductive, Genetic, and Sexual Health -we see how far and how little we have progressed in dealing with many traditional "women's issues." The topics span from familiar issues such as abortion and new reproductive technologies to human cloning and genetic counseling for breast cancer. Probably one of the most unique essays in this section is Naoko Miyaji's discussion of the possibility of using legal remedies to increase male responsibility for birth control and reproductive responsibility. Other essays in this section also address the issue of what we owe "others." From Susan Sherwin's consideration of how an infertile woman's decision to pursue treatment influences the "normalization" of infertility technology to a genetic counselor's attempt to explain the implications of a genetic test in non-medicalized terms in Fernanda Carneiro and Roberto dos Santos Bartholo Junior's essay on breast cancer, many of the authors view these ethical problems as relational problems. Not just relations between individuals but between communities and/or the individual and the community as a whole. In other words, what do we owe both specific "others" (e.g., the patient before me now) and the community of "others" in which we live (e.g., both present and future women of reproductive age).
The final section -Medical Research and Treatmentaddresses the potential and problems of including women in clinical trials as well as problems of unethical research in general. Carol Quinn looks at the problem of whether or not we should use data from Nazi experiments and -more importantly -who should decide this question. Jeanelle de Gruchy and Laurel Baldwin-Ragaven address the issue of medical abuses under apartheid. Both of these essays are useful for thinking about how to heal wounds and recover trust between communities after medical abuses have been committed. This section also includes an interesting essay on organ transplantation in which Kathleen Kurtz argues that dealing with our phobia about death could potentially eliminate two related problems. It would create the possibility for patients to opt out of going on the organ recipient list, thereby sparing some patients the emotional and physical hardships associated with waiting for a possible transplant. Second, it may help us come up with better ways to approach families who have lost a member about donating organs (and, thereby, increasing the overall number of donations).
In sum, Globalizing Feminist Bioethics is an excellent example of crosscultural discussions about feminism. Granted this book is a collection and not strictly a "collaborative" work. However, when read together, they create complementary crosscultural discussions of the range and scope of feminisms around the globe. In general, the collection shows nicely the potential for multicultural coalitions that work together for common goals while also respecting diversity. In particular, each of these papers expresses a clear and deep commitment to ending abuse and oppression and helping every woman have a voice. The call from all these essays is that women -regardless of culture, class, and so on -should be respected as full persons with something valuable to contribute to a great range of discussions. So, while the authors may disagree on specific policies or issues, all agree that women everywhere should have a voice in deciding these issues -proving the feminist umbrella is broad enough to include multiple opinions as long as we share a commitment to improving the lives of women. 
Feminist Interpretations of Mary
Reviewed by Alison Bailey
Illinois State University
Sarah Hoagland and Marilyn Frye's new anthology, Feminist Interpretations of Mary Daly, is a self-proclaimed "open-ended journey" into Daly's philosophy and the very patriarchal canon she resists. Like some of the earlier "Rereading the Canon" volumes, which situate women thinkers into a canon crafted to exclude them, this volume (with purposeful irony) places Daly "into the very canon which she herself has argued is a branch of patriarchal religion grounded in the dismemberment of the Goddess, and which her work is dedicated to undermining by means of animating women's possibilities" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:2) . At the same time, this collection places Daly in a rapidly emerging feminist canon that continues to distance itself from the radical feminism of the 1960s-70s. Viewing radical feminism as framework in progress, and not as an eight-year experiment that ultimately failed, reveals uncharted territories and new possibilities for projects grounded in Daly's work. This collection takes the first steps into this newly imagined territory.
Whether Daly's work changed/saved your life -or, like me, you never read her closely because the word on the academic streets was that she had nothing serious to offerthis volume will forever change the way you think about one of the most prolific feminist writers of our time. For Daly scholars, this anthology is filled with suggestions for new research projects. Daly skeptics will find unexpected interest in the daring and creative applications of her ideas to third wave feminist conversations. In any case, the collection brings together enough innovative re-readings of Daly's work to safely predict a renewed interest in her systematic philosophy, if not a renaissance in Daly scholarship.
The first half dozen papers engage Mar y Daly the theologian. Wanda Warren Berry's opening essay offers a brief summary of Daly's early theological projects, and quickly turns to a discussion of her use of theology as metaphor. Daly's work, "aims to show that the women's revolution is an ontological, spiritual revolution, pointing beyond the idolatries of sexist society and sparking creative action in and toward transcendence" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:32) . Berry explains the role of metaphor in Daly's revolutionary strategy and the importance of fashioning new metaphors as a way of shifting logics, and reorganizing our perception. She explores Verbing and Naming as two strategies Daly uses to get us to think about reality as process rather than unchanging substance.
Laurel C. Schneider rereads Daly as a student of Paul Tillich by identifying the similarities and differences between their methodologies. Where Tillich engages Man's existential dread of non-being, Daly couches this dread in terms of "the shock of non-being" women face under patriarchy, when they realize the full scope and depth of patriarchy's structural evil. Like Tillich, Daly makes connections between existential questions and ontological and theological concerns, and describes how Daly pirates, accepts, criticizes, and moves beyond Tillich's central concepts. She concludes, "that the radical aspect of Daly's work lies not in her rejection of the Western epistemological and theological traditions, but in her creative and critical use of these traditions to begin building a systematic project" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:56) .
Anne-Marie Korte addresses the complex role of religious faith in Daly's writings. She views what appears to be a contradictor y combination of antiessentialism and gynocentrism in terms of Daly's ambiguous stance toward the place of religion in women's struggle for self-actualization. Beauvoir 's existentialist feminism in general, and her gendered concept of "bad faith" in particular, had a major impact on Daly's understanding of religious faith. Her discussion begins with Beauvoir's account of religion as both promoting bad faith and, by means of extraordinary religious experience, as a way to move away from positions of subordination. By creating an alternative nonlinear herstory and symbolic, Daly is able to move beyond Beauvoir 's exploration of women's victimization and bad faith to embrace a new set of strategies and world-making. Conception of the subjectivity, rather than being a constructed in opposition to an other, rose not from fear of non-being, but from a desire for more being.
Those who insist that Daly's "essentialism" dates the usefulness of her work will do well to read Marja Suhonen's contribution to the volume. Suhonen's essay clearly demonstrates how this predominant understanding is based on an inaccurate reading of Daly's work. Since Daly's early work emphasizes being and doing over essence, she is more properly characterized as an existentialist. And her later work, on metamorphosis and transformation, pirates Aristotle's notion of realization while rejecting his essentialism. The Biophilic self, for instance, is in continuous process. Thus, instead of being an essentialist, Daly is a thinker who shares the basic ideas of process theology in which the future is always open.
For Sheilagh A. Mogford, the importance of Daly 's theological work extends beyond a simple critique of patriarchal religions. Most of us go through much of our lives overlooking the highly ritualized nature of daily social interactions used to maintain the dominant patriarchal order. In Gyn/Ecology, Daly views these myths and rituals through the lens of the "Sado-Ritual Syndrome." By viewing women's experiences through the seven components of this lens, we are able to detect patterns among what initially appear to be unrelated threads. Mogford directs this lens toward Margaret Atwood's distopian novel, The Handmaid's Tale. She also reads into the present Atwood's imagined future, in which right-wing fundamentalists have taken over the United States.
There is a sense in which the corpus of Daly's work is about departure. In "Be-ing is Be/Leaving," Debra Campbell maintains that Daly's many carefully negotiated departures in her work since the early 1970s constitute one of her most important contributions to feminist theory. These departure narratives return to two central themes: feminist women's complicated and personal process of Be/Leaving, and the challenge of being for the sake of which all Be/Leaving takes place. Daly's focus on these two issues and the dialogue between them has profoundly affected her approach to SelfDisclosure. Daly's willingness to write about these issues with reference to her own life may be among her most enduring legacies. Thus, Campbell focuses on the many selves Daly reveals to us and shows us why the fundamental connections between being, Be/Leaving, and Hagography, are important to explore.
The next three essays highlight Daly's use of language as an instrument of transformation. Molly Dragiewicz uses the tools in Daly's discourse analysis to expose/oppose the strategies used to exclude oppositional vocabularies and meanings from mainstream discussions of rape. Daly identifies four ways discourses are used to maintain existing power relations: erasure, reversal, false polarization, and divide and conquer. Dragiewicz begins with a history of acquaintance rape discourse in popular newsmagazines from the mid-1980s to the present. Applying Daly's framework to this discourse, she explains how these tactics are used in mainstream journalism to hold dominant discourses on rape in place.
In the next essay, Frances Gray explains the "relationship Mary Daly sees between language and ontology, particularly women as constituted through language practice, and how Mary Daly's writing is an ontologically creative performance that opens up possibilities for women's naming themselves and their worlds for themselves" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:10) . Gray focuses on three facets of the language/ontology connection: (a) the strategy of using language against itself as a way of undermining "neutral" language and making women's language possible, (b) the role of naming as an active way of inventing language, and (c) the importance of metaphor as a creative process that makes new understandings of 'woman' possible.
The second part of the anthology offers a series of innovative critiques. Here the linguistic theme continues. In "Wicked Caló: A Matter of Authority of Improper Words," María -Feminism and Philosophy --77 -
FEMINISM
Lugones argues that the practices of compiling dictionaries and looking up words are never politically neutral. In a dramatic comparison between Daly's Wickedary and El Libro de Caló/Pachuco Slang Dictionary -two dictionaries of "the linguistically improper" -she challenges the reader to move in new ways into new worlds of sense. The movement into and between these worlds, however, is problematized by the fact that each text "anticipates the arrival of others" in very different ways. Having explored the transgressive logic of both texts, Lugones resists the temptation to translate. She also laments the impossibility of a "wicked caló." "The Wickedary does not take to the streets to learn its strategy but rather challenges a system of domination through conceptual maneuvering. . . . Thus it cannot meet up with Caló and with marimachas who exercise themselves in an in-between linguistic style that defies spatial rulings" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:262) .
The publication of Audre Lorde's 1979 "Open Letter to Mary Daly" is commonly offered as evidence that Daly's vision is hopelessly Eurocentric and thus incapable of addressing the important questions that characterize third wave feminism. Amber Katherine's essay offers possible answers to the often-asked question, "Why didn't Daly respond to Lorde's letter?" while also providing a previously unavailable framework for understanding Lorde's criticisms of Daly. Daly's failure to reply is best understood in retrospect. Katherine begins by situating the letter against the background of 1960s-70s radical political movements, Daly and Lorde's common project before Gyn/Ecology, the use of Lorde's letter by white academic feminists, and the events in her life that lead her to engage Lorde's letter. With these interlocking histories in place, Katherine concludes that Daly did not reply because she "would have heard the letter as a shift in Lorde's perspective or a betrayal" and not as a "call for a new sisterhood based [on] the recognition that patriarchy intersects with other systems of oppression, creating different experiences of oppression" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:293) .
Daly's failure to reply, however, does not mean that her apparent Eurocentrism cannot be instructive in other ways. In a second essay, Katherine uses insights from María Lugones's work to play on Lorde's sister outsider language, using the insider/outsider distinction to suggest how radical white feminists might reread Gyn/Ecology as an exercise in unblocking identification with the insider self. "Part of what can be accomplished through such a rereading," she concludes, "is a sense of one's self in relation to others, which makes a deeper kind of hearing possible" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:318) .
Daly is criticized not only for her exclusive use of European Goddess imagery, but also for her choice to use colonial texts in her discussion of Sati. Runka Sharma and Purushottama Bilimoria revisit Daly 's often-ridiculed discussion of Sati/Sutee in Gyn/Ecology. Although Daly rightly criticizes Westerners for erasing Indian women's agency in such discussions, the authors argue that Daly never suggests a way of retrieving this erased subjectivity. They examine Daly's analysis through a post-colonial lens with an eye toward complementing her argument by historically situating the practice in a context unconstrained by colonial discourse. In particular, they argue that Daly conflates two projects: (a) finding evidence of global patriarchal religion's oppression of women, and (b) locating women's agency in Sati in particular cultural contexts. They offer two examples of female potency as examples of resistant subjectivity.
In an effort to move beyond the perceived cultural narrowness of Daly's examples, AnaLouise Keating puts Daly in dialogue with Paula Gunn Allen, Gloría Anzaldúa, and Audre Lorde. Believing that Daly's work "opens up new spaces where the creation of transculturally contextualized images of feminine spiritual power can occur," Keating offers a detailed exploration of "the psycholinguistic implications of Daly's call for feminist spiritualities and female divines" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:352) . The similarities between these theorists' discussions of feminist spirituality and mythmaking and the attempt of each to redefine the past from present perspectives is striking. Whereas most feminist scholars have used Lorde's "Open Letter" to reveal Daly's shortcomings, Keating argues that placing Daly in conversation with feminists of color demonstrates "the possibility of writing the 'feminine' in open-ended nonexclusionary ways that revise previous notions of the universal" (Hoagland and Frye 2000:352) .
Geraldine Moane focuses on the question of how to break out of the psychic damage associated with oppression. She addresses the possibilities of transforming psychic damage in a discussion of Irish women's psychological liberation. Moane uses Daly's Foreground/Background distinction to explore Ireland's colonial and post-colonial dimensions. In the Foreground lies the legacy of patriarchal institutions (e.g., the Roman Catholic Church) and in the Background lie women's traditions grounded in Celtic and Gaelic cultures. Moane's task is to re-member the Background. Drawing on a series of lively interviews with Irish women, stories from the Irish Women's Camp, and stories of women's collective action, she identifies practices that help us to realize our power.
In the volume's final essay, Anne-Marie Korte takes us on a temporal journey through Daly's Quintessence. Daly's text, she argues, is less about how women perceive time, than it is about the notions of time we need to embrace to be able to do women justice (Hoagland and Frye 2000:419) .
Hayes Hampton's helpful bibliography, "Secondary Sources on Mary Daly," completes the collection.
